We analyze a stylized model of co-evolution between any two purely competing species (e.g., host and parasite), both sexually reproducing. Similarly to a recent model of Livnat et al.
Introduction
An exciting recent line of work in the theory of computation has focused on the algorithmic power of the evolutionary process (Valiant [48] , Livnat et al. [25, 24] ). The latter two papers identified as interesting the case of a sexually reproducing, haploidal, and panmictic (explained below) species, evolving in a fixed environment according to variants of Multiplicative Weights Update dynamics [11, 12] -which are typically referred to as "replicator dynamics" in the evolutionary dynamics literature [50] . Curiously, however, Mehta et al. [27] made the discovery that these dynamics lead in the long run (in almost all cases) to a genetic monoculture. This rather contradicts the evidence of natural diversity around us.
Several plausible explanations exist for this discrepancy, including: (a) mutations [28] , (b) speciation (e.g., the Bateson-Dobzhansky-Muller model) [19] , (c) the mathematical assumptions are too far from reality, (d) "in the long run" is longer than geologic time. There is, however, a long-standing argument, that there is another (and perhaps more important) factor driving diversity; to our knowledge this case was first compellingly laid out by Ehrlich and Raven in 1964 [15] : "It is apparent that reciprocal selective responses have been greatly underrated as a factor in the origination of organic diversity." (Already Darwin noted the significance of coevolution, e.g., between orchids and moths that feed on their nectar; but the proposed implication for diversity seems to have come later.) In the ensuing decades this idea played a role in the Red Queen Hypothesis [47] and was advanced as an explanation of an advantage of sexual over asexual reproduction [6] .
Apart from empirical study (e.g., [10, 46, 35, 8] ), the dynamics of co-evolution have also been studied mathematically, but primarily (explicitly or implicitly) for asexual reproduction-dynamics in which the abundance of a genome changes over time in proportion to its fitness (possibly with mutations), as in the work of Eigen, Schuster and others [16, 17, 32, 44, 45] . The case of sexual reproduction, however, is quite different. There is a good mathematical model for these dynamics, called the "weak selection" model [31] , but effects of co-evolution are not yet understood in this model.
We study a specific class of systems in this model, and provide a quantitative study of the evolutionary dynamics of sexual species in highly competitive ("zero sum") interactions. This study supports the thesis of Ehrlich and Raven, that competition drives diversity, in a strong form: not only does a genetic monoculture not take over, but in fact the entropy of the species' genomes is bounded away from 0 for all time. Thus we support a rationale for ecosystem diversity without invoking mutation, speciation or environmental change.
A sexual species under weak evolutionary pressures (to be made precise) can be modeled, gametheoretically, as a team, whose players are the genes [25, 12] . A team in a multiplayer game [26, 40] is a set of players who share a common payoff but use independent randomness. In our setting we have two teams that compete against each other for survival. Learning dynamics in such games create dynamical systems entirely unlike those explored in the no-regret learning in games literature [9] . For example although there have been quite a few papers arguing about nonequilibrium limit cycles in game dynamics [13, 21, 23, 34, 33] , these typically explore small games with a maximum of two or three players, each with two or three available strategies. Even in these settings the analysis is typically intricate and is based on case-by-case observations that do not generalize to large classes of games. In a handful of cases where non-equilibrium behavior is proven [37, 36, 30] in larger games, the non-equilibrium behavior is typically non-periodic, and thus to a large extent unpredictable. In contrast, we present a large parametric class of multi-agent games for which we prove periodicity from almost all initial conditions.
Class of Games:
We establish our results in the restrictive setting of "Boolean phenotypes". To explain, we will be studying a zero-sum competition between two species A and B. Organism A has n genes, and organism B has m genes. Each is haploid (possessing, for each gene, exactly one of the possible alleles), so that a genotype of species A is a vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ), and that of species B is σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ m ). In the Boolean-phenotype model there are Boolean-valued functions and a 2 × 2 payoff matrix U such that the result of an encounter between s and σ is a payoff of U (f (s), g(σ)) (to A, and minus this to B). 1 As compared with the full reach of evolutionary dynamics this is a limited setting, but there are two good reasons to examine it.
1. This already constitutes an extension to two competing and adapting learners, of the study of evolutionary learning of Boolean functions initiated in [25] .
2. There are biological examples which approximately fit this assumption-not with respect to the entire phenotype, but w.r.t. that aspect of the phenotype which is critical to the twospecies interaction. E.g., the length of a hummingbird's beak vs. that of a flower; the size of a crab's pincers vs. the shell thickness of its prey; the choice of protein coatings employed by a microbe, and the corresponding immune response.
Not every 2 × 2 game is, of course, zero sum; e.g., above, the interaction may be favorable to the hummingbird and to the flowering plant. However, we are interested in the effects of competition, and competition, in its purest form, is zero-sum. There is good reason, however, to view this zerosum interaction not as between two players but as between two teams, with the members of each team being the genes of the species (a point of view influentially advocated by Dawkins [14] ). The fact that the genes are, as "agents", pursuing their optimization independently of one another, is crucial to the dynamics of sexual evolution.
Dynamics: The most tractable model of sexual evolution is to have the population at all times be in a product distribution evolving according to the replicator equation. (The correspondence between this continuous dynamic and the discrete-time MWU was described in [22, 27, 12] ; MWU is an ubiquitous meta-algorithm with numerous connections within the field of computer science [3] . In this paper we work directly in the replicator framework.) The replicator equation [42, 41] , given below in Eq. 1, is among the basic tools in mathematical ecology, genetics and the mathematical theory of evolution. Replicator dynamics and MWU have been studied extensively in numerous classes of games. For example, in the case of potential games where the utilities of all agents are perfectly aligned, these learning processes are known to converge to Nash equilibria and in fact generically to pure (non-randomized) Nash [22] . On the contrary in zero-sum games [39, 1, 37] it is known that they can exhibit complex chaotic behavior, highly sensitive to initial conditions (butterfly effect).
In our setting, an exceedingly rare form of structure manifests. We identify a novel class of conservative systems, analogous to Hamiltonian dynamics (e.g. ideal pendulum). The conserved quantity does not have a meaning of energy. This "constant of the motion" is a new type of structure that has not been reported before that emerges from the combination of evolutionary dynamics and Boolean logic (Lemma 9). Possession of a conserved quantity is no reason to expect periodicity, as the dynamics are high dimensional. 2 The orbits are shown to be periodic via a novel 1 Like any multiplayer game, such team zero-sum games have Nash equilibria; but unlike the two-player zero-sum game which they resemble, the team game generally has a positive duality gap. (See [40] where this is worked out, and earlier [49] for the case of a team vs. a single player.) This gap creates an opportunity for very rich dynamics when each gene continually adjusts its allele frequencies to the competition.
2 m + n variables, minus 1 degree of freedom for the constant of the motion.
type of embedding argument: Each orbit can be projected to a, possibly different, planar (and thus periodic) conservative system without any loss of information. (Proposition 6 and Lemma 8). Theorem 1: Given any two-team zero-sum game defined by two Boolean functions, so long as all equilibria/fixed points are isolated, then all but a zero measure set of initial conditions lie on periodic trajectories of the replicator dynamics. (Formal statement in Section 3, Theorem 11). Figure 1 : Given generic initial conditions the system is periodic regardless of the pair of Boolean functions defining it. The initial conditions, trajectories are of the form (x 1 (t), x 2 (t), y 1 (t), y 2 (t)).
An immediate corollary of our theorem is that since all monocultures are fixed points of the dynamics, almost all initial conditions lie on trajectories that remain bounded away from the monocultures. It is interesting to note that although the above theorem is robust to the choice of the competing Boolean functions, e.g., XOR-XOR, AND-AND, AND-XOR, etc., the topology of the periodic orbits is highly sensitive to the choice of these functions (see Figure 1) .
Besides proving periodicity, we analyze this phenomenon from a game-theoretic/optimality lens as well. We show that the time-average play over the strategy outcomes of the team zero-sum game is a correlated equilibrium. Unlike zero-sum games, in team zero-sum games [40] (even Boolean team zero-sum games) Nash equilibria may include outcomes of widely varying utilities for each team (the notion of value no longer exists). Nevertheless, we show something extremely surprising about these evolutionary dynamics on "selfish" genes: sexual evolution leads to gene coordination that "solves" the zero-sum competition at the species level (see Figure 2 ). Thus, in three different ways, sexual evolution implements an optimal strategy: Theorem 2: Given any periodic orbit, the time average distribution of play over strategy outcomes converges point-wise to a correlated equilibrium of the team zero-sum game. Moreover, the time average Boolean output of each team converges to its unique Nash equilibrium strategy of the 2 × 2 zero-sum game U . The time average expected utility of each agent converges to the value of its team in the zero-sum game U . (Formal statement in Section 4, Theorems 14 and 15).
Sexual evolution solves the game optimally at the level of the species, despite the fact that it works on the level of the genes and that any signal coming from the species level interaction is constantly getting scrambled due to genetic recombination.
Structure of the paper: Section 2 starts with an exposition of the model, formal definitions of the game setting, as well as the learning dynamic. Section 3 contains the analysis of the periodicity of the model and starts with a high level description of the proof structure. Section 4 develops the connections to game theory, Nash and correlated equilibria and analyzes the time-average of payoffs and system behavior. The paper ends with a discussion section (Section 5). The Appendix contains a section on background material on topology and dynamical systems. The time averages of the outputs of both teams (f, g) converge to the fully mixed NE of the game (50%, 50%). The time average of the expected utility of the first team (and hence the second as well) converges to the value of the game (which in this case is equal to 0.5).
Preliminaries
Notation: Vectors are in bold-face, and unless otherwise indicated are considered as column vectors. The transpose of x is x T . The i th coordinate of x is x i . x −i is the vector derived by removing x i from x. |S| is the cardinality of set S. ∆(S) is the probability simplex with support set S, i.e., {(x 1 , x 2 , . . . x |S| ) :
Zero-Sum Games among Species: We have two species, A and B. A's genome has n genes, and B's has m genes. Both are haploids which means that each organism has one allele per gene. (This is the simplest possibility. Humans are diploid, and other numbers are possible.) The proportion of organisms of species A that have allele γ in their i-th gene is written x iγ . Similarly for B the proportion of organisms that have allele δ in their j-th gene is y jδ . Clearly, γ x iγ = 1 and δ y jδ = 1 for any i or j. In this paper we focus on the simplified setting that each gene of the host/parasite organism has two variants/alleles (i.e., allele 0 and 1). Thus, the genotype of an organism in A (resp. B) is a Boolean vector of length n (resp. m) and we will abbreviate notation by writing x i0 as x i . The vector (x, y) = (x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y m ) expressing the composition of alleles in each population of organisms can be thought of as encoding a randomized strategy for each gene (the mixed strategy (x i , 1 − x i ) for gene i in species A).
A more important simplifying assumption is that each genotype produces one of only two possible phenotypes (e.g., Rh blood factor +/−, long vs. short beak, etc.). A phenotype in our context is simply an arbitrary boolean function on the genome; for s ∈ {0, 1} n we let f (s) ∈ {0, 1} be the phenotype of organism A, and likewise g(σ) for σ ∈ {0, 1} m . The significance of this mapping is that organisms interact only through their phenotype. The payoff for this interaction is given by a utility (or fitness) function u(s,σ)=U (f (s),g(σ)), where U is a payoff matrix of dimension 2 × 2. When organisms s, σ interact, each gene in organism A receives the same utility u(s,σ) while each gene in organism B receives the same utility −u(s,σ).
A natural example is as follows: A is a parasite and B is the host. If the outcomes of functions f, g match, i.e., the "key" of the parasite matches the "lock" of the host, then the utility of the host is −1 and the utility of the parasite is +1. Otherwise, the utilities are reversed. In this case, matrix U is the Matching Pennies payoff matrix.
, or equivalently U = 1 −1 −1 1
More generally, we allow for the zero-sum game defined by
to be any 2×2 zero sum game that which has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is fully mixed. (i.e., either min(a, d) > max(b, c) or max(a, d) < min(b, c), or equivalently, the best response sequence cycles (clockwise/anti-clockwise) along the four outcomes.) 3 Replicator Dynamics and Weak Selection in the Evolution of Sexual Species If p is the distribution on genomes s of species A and q is the distribution on genomes σ of species B, write u s = σ q(σ)u(s, σ) (the fitness of genome s) and u = s p(s)u s . The replicator dynamics are that the rate of change of p(s) isṗ(s) = p(s)(u s − u). A few lines of calculation show that the resulting rate of change of x i (the fraction of the population having allele 0 in gene i) iṡ
where
being the fitness of allele 0 of gene i. Similarly for genes of species B,ẏ
The work of Nagylaki in 1993 focused attention on study of these dynamics in the "weak selection" model. In a sexual species, panmictic mating (mating of individuals selected uniformly and independently) without selection pressures, leads over time to the genome distribution being a product distribution, that is, to p(s)
The weak selection model makes the approximation that selection is slow enough relative to reproduction that the genome may be considered at all times to be in a product distribution, with time-dependent marginals x i and y j . The prior work [12, 25, 27, 29] is entirely within this model and it will be our focus as well. In weak selection the equations 1, 2 may be considered a complete description of the process rather than merely summary statistics.
What distinguishes our dynamics from prior work is that the fitness of a genotype is no longer a constant but depends on the composition of the population of the other species; the fitness of an allele of a particular gene depends on the compositions of both populations (except in that one gene).
Genes↔Agents, Species↔Team of Agents, Allele↔Strategy. In terms of the analysis, it will be helpful to think of the biological setting in purely game theoretic terms. The immediate game theoretic analogue of this setting is to study competitions between two teams, A and B. The first team has n agents, whereas the second has m. Each agent has two strategies, strategies 0 and 1 and we denote by x i def = x i0 the probability with which he chooses strategy 0. Given a strategy outcome, all choices of agents in team A, (resp. B) are used as input in the Boolean functions of each team f (resp. g) and each team participates with its respective output in the 2 × 2 zero-sum game U . All agents in a team enjoy exactly the same utility, i.e., their team's utility in game U . We denote by u i , u i0 , u i1 respectively the expected utility of agent i, the expected utility of agent i given that he chooses 0 and the expected utility of agent i given that he chooses 1 (where the randomness is over the product distribution over the mixed strategies of all agents).
Existence and Uniqueness of Global Solution The theory of differential equations ensures (for more details see, e.g., Chapter 6 of [50] or [2] ) that replicator dynamics of a multi-player game from initial conditions (i.e., initial probability distributions) z 0 , have a unique global solution Φ(z 0 , ·) : R → i ∆(S i ); furthermore that this solution is smooth as a function of time and initial conditions. We define a trajectory or orbit through an initial state z 0 as the image of the whole time axis under the solution mapping Φ(z 0 , ·):
To ease notation, when keeping track of the initial condition is not critical, we write z(t) instead of Φ(z 0 , t). We write x(t), (resp. y(t)) to denote the current (product) mixed strategy profile of genes in species A (resp. B) or x i (t) (resp. y j (t)) to denote the mixed strategy of a specific gene.
Analysis

Overview of the Proof
A critical insight is that instead of tracking the true state of the system z(t) = (x(t),y(t)) = (x 1 (t), . . . , x n (t), y 1 (t), . . . , y m (t)), and directly trying to argue about the system in its native state space, we will focus on the quantities E s∼x f (s) and E σ∼y g(σ), i.e., the expected output of the Boolean functions of both teams of agents. We will denote these quantities as f, g. 4 As it turns out, it will be convenient to think of the distribution (f, 1−f ) as encoding a mixed strategy implemented in the 2 × 2 zero-sum game U .
In Section 3.2, we identify and classify the equilibria (fixed points) of the dynamics. These equilibria can be grouped into two categories. Nash fixed points are states in which the expected output of each Boolean function (f, g) encodes the unique (fully mixed) Nash equilibrium of the 2 × 2 zero-sum game U . These are stationary due to the fact that no team can deviate and gain the upper hand on its opposing team. The second type of fixed points, are states where at least one of the two teams got "stuck". Their opposing team (e.g., team B) is not (necessarily) implementing its minimax strategy but nevertheless no agent of team A can influence the expected outcome of his team's Boolean function via unilateral deviations. One such example is when team A is implementing a XOR function and at least two agents choose between 0, 1 uniformly at random. We call these fixed points strange fixed points as they intuitively correspond to evolutionary flukes, where changes to no single gene can affect the composition of the species.
In Section 3.3, we focus on a single population and show that the corresponding vector field can be expressed as a product of a scalar "rate" term (that depends on the mixed strategy of the opposing species) and a vector that only depends on the team's own behavior (Proposition 2). Thus, the trajectory that each team traverses depends only the Boolean function that it implements (e.g., f ) and its own initial condition (e.g., x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ). Effectively, this trajectory corresponds to replicator dynamics in a common utility/potential game where the joint utility of each agent in any mixed strategy outcome is the expected output f of the team's Boolean function. This connection to potential games becomes handy for several reasons. First, in Theorem 4, we prove that strange fixed points are indeed evolutionary flukes that can be ruled out under typical genericity conditions. Secondly, in Proposition 5, we can already establish that f, g exhibit a natural "chasing" relationship, which is an early step towards proving periodicity. That is, if we interpret the expected output of each organism as a mixed strategy with which the organism participates in the zero-sum game then this mixed strategy will move in the direction that would have increased its expected payoff given the mixed strategy of the opposing species. This creates a "chasing" behavior with the directionality of the movement of each mixed strategy (i.e., increasing or decreasing) flipping when the opposing team's strategy transitions through the unique (mixed) Nash equilibrium of the game.
Furthermore, in Section 3.4, we leverage the connections to potential games to formally prove that it suffices to keep track only of the quantities f, g. As explained above, these quantities correspond to the potential function in a common utility/potential game where the joint utility of each agent in any mixed strategy outcome is the expected output of each team's Boolean function. In such a potential game, along any nontrivial trajectory the common utility/potential is strictly increasing with time and thus given any initial condition x 0 there exists a bijective function between the time range over which the trajectory is defined, (−∞, ∞), and the range of potential values over this trajectory. Thus, given the initial condition of the team's behavior and the current output of the team, e.g., f (t), the current behavior of each member of the team x i (t) is uniquely defined. In a sense, each trajectory can be embedded onto a two dimensional system since given the initial conditions of both teams as long as we keep track of each team's expected output f, g we can uniquely identify the exact state of the system.
In order to prove the system periodicity we need to establish connections to the theory of Hamiltonian systems. In Section 3.5 we show that the two dimensional system that couples f, g together is effectively a conservative system that preserves an energy-like function. Specifically, up to team specific reparametrizations and change of variables, the dynamical system has the form
which is a standard Hamiltonian system with Hamiltonian function equal to H = f 2 +g 2 2 . In this parameterization all trajectories are cycles centered at 0. In our case, this conserved quantity, or "constant of the motion", is more elaborate; nevertheless, once we establish it exists, we can leverage standard tools from topology of dynamical systems (Appendix C), and establish that its orbits are periodic (Theorem 10). Putting everything in this section together, Theorem 1 (more formally given as Theorem 11) follows.
Finally, in Section 4 we investigate the game-theoretic properties of these periodic orbits. By periodicity, the time-averages of all involved quantities are well defined. In Theorem 14 we show that the time-average play over the strategy outcomes of the team zero-sum game is a correlated equilibrium of that game. Unlike zero-sum games, in team zero-sum games [40] (even Boolean team zero-sum games) their sets of (Nash) equilibria may include outcomes of widely varying utilities for each team. Nevertheless, in Theorem 2 (given more formally as 15), we establish that sexual evolution leads to gene coordination at the species level, in a time-averaged sense. Namely, time average of the output of each team (f, g) is equal to the unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium strategy of that team in the 2 × 2 zero-sum game U . Furthermore, the average utility of each team (and hence all of its members) is exactly equal to its value in the two species zero-sum competition.
System Description & Fixed Points:
The Nash, the Strange & the Partial Lemma 1. There exists a constant α = 0 such that the replicator system equations reduce to:
where (p, 1 − p), (q, 1 − q) the unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium strategy in game U, −U T and where
The proof of Lemma 1 deferred to Appendix A. This reparametrization does not affect the shape of the trajectories. Hence, we assume wlog α to be equal to 1.
Structure of fixed points. Amongst all equilibria with full support, there exist two different types of fixed points. The first type corresponds to outcomes where f = p and g = q, i.e., outcomes in which the expected output of each Boolean function encodes the unique (fully mixed) Nash equilibrium of the 2 × 2 zero-sum game. We call these Nash fixed points. The second type of fixed points, we have either f i1 = f i0 for all agents i of team A, or g j1 = g j0 for all agents j of team B, or both. We call these fixed points, strange fixed points. 5 These are fixed points where at least one of the two teams got "stuck". Their opposing team (e.g., team B) is not (necessarily) implementing its minimax strategy but nevertheless no agent of team A can influence the expected outcome of his team's Boolean function via unilateral deviations. One such example is when team A is implementing a XOR function and at least two agents choose between 0, 1 uniformly at random.
Finally there exist fixed points in which some agents are using pure strategies (e.g., x i , y j = 0 or 1). We call these partial support fixed points. We can complete the categorization by defining as partial support Nash fixed points, (resp. partial support strange fixed points) those partial support fixed points with at least one randomizing agent such that when examining the subgame defined by those strategies played with positive probability then they encode a Nash (resp. strange) fixed point. Fixed points without any randomizing agents are called pure fixed points.
The Topology of the Trajectory of Team A is Independent of Team B
Proposition 2. The trajectory of team A {x ∈ [0, 1] n : (x, y) = Φ((x 0 , y 0 ), t) for some t ∈ R} is a subset of the trajectory of systeṁ
with initial condition x 0 , which is independent of team B. We call this system, team's A subsystem and we denote its solution by Φ A (x, t). Moreover, f is a strict Lyapunov function in this system. That is, given any initial condition x = x 0 we have
Proof The multiplicative term (g − q) is common across all terms of the vector field corresponding to agents in team A in lemma 1. Hence, it dictates the magnitude of the vector field (the speed of the motion), but does not affect directionality other than moving backwards or forwards along the same trajectory. Specifically, both systemsẋ i = x i (1 − x i )(f i0 − f i1 ) for all agents in team A, and
) for all agents in team A have exactly the same orbits (but traverse them in opposite direction). So, the trajectory of team A in our original system corresponds to a subset of a specific orbit of subsystem A. This specific orbit starts at the initial condition x 0 (A-team's initial condition in the original system). Moreover, we will show that f is a strict Lyapunov function for this projected system. Due to the multilinearity of f on x i 's: f = x i f i0 + (1 −
The summation is clearly nonnegative and it is only equal to zero at the fixed points of Φ A .
Connection to potential games. Team's A subsystem is equivalent to applying replicator dynamics to a partnership game (a game where all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} agents receive the same payoff/utility at each (mixed) outcome) where the common utility function at mixed strategy x is equal to f (x) = E s∼x f (s). A partnership game is a potential game with potential function equal to the common utility. The potential is a strictly increasing function along any non-trivial system trajectory and all initial conditions implying convergence to equilibria (see e.g., [22] ). We will leverage this connection and our current understanding of replicator dynamics in potential games from [22] to argue that in system Φ only a measure zero set of initial conditions may converge to strange fixed points.
Definition 3.
We call an initial condition x 0 of subsystem Φ A safe, if and only if, the orbit Φ A (x 0 , ·) does not converge to a non-pure 6 fixed point for t → ±∞. Analogous definitions apply for subsystem Φ B as well. We call an initial condition (x 0 , y 0 ) of system Φ safe, if and only if, both x 0 and y 0 are safe in their respective subsystems.
By proposition 2, given a safe initial condition (x 0 , y 0 ), its respective orbit Φ((x 0 , y 0 ), ·) clearly cannot converge to a partial strange fixed point for t → ±∞. Indeed, a necessary condition for convergence to a partial strange fixed point in Φ given initial condition (x 0 , y 0 ) as t → ±∞ is that either Φ A (x 0 , ·) or Φ B (y 0 , , ·) converge to a non-pure fixed point as t → ±∞. The proof of theorem 4 is deferred to appendix B. At this point we can show that the expected outputs f, g of the two teams when viewed as mixed strategies (i.e., probability distributions) (f, 1 − f ), (g, 1 − g) in the 2 × 2 zero-sum game are being updated in a "rational" way. Specifically, when they are updated according to the system equations they will develop a "chasing" behavior where each mixed strategy will move towards the direction that myopically increases its expected payoff in the zero-sum game. This statement in itself does not suffice to argue periodicity as one can easily create trajectories (not of our dynamics of course) that spiral towards the fully mixed Nash equilibrium or diverge to the boundary while displaying this chasing behavior.
Proposition 5. Unless no agent of team A can influence the output of f via unilateral deviations, the expected output of team's A Boolean function, f , will increase (decrease) if and only if the output g of team B is larger (smaller) than q (q = the probability of choosing the first action in its unique Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game). Similarly, g will decrease (increase) when the output f of team A is larger (smaller) than p (p = the probability of choosing the first action in its unique Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game).
Proof Due to the multilinearity of f on x i 's: f = x i f i1 + (1 − x i )f i0 and therefore
Combining this with the vector field form presented in lemma 1 we have that
The summation is clearly nonnegative. In fact, it is only equal to zero at the fixed points of team's A subsystem.
From this point forward we will focus on safe initial conditions. This is a full measure set within the set of all initial conditions. We will prove that any such state is periodic, i.e., it lies on a closed orbit by establishing connections to planar Hamiltonian systems.
Reduction to 2-Dimensional Systems via Competing Lyapunov Functions
The next proposition states that knowledge of the initial condition as well as of the evolving values of f, g suffices (in principle) to recover the complete system state at any time t.
Proposition 6. Given a safe initial condition z 0 = (x 0 , y 0 ), of system Φ as well that the values f (t), g(t), there exist smooth functions
)) for all t ∈ R and for each agent i of team A (resp. for each agent j of team B).
Proof If x(t) (resp. y(t)) is time invariant, then the problem is trivial. Suppose not. We will argue that given an initial condition for every agent i of team A, i.e., x 0 , its mixed strategy at time t, as captured by x i (t) is uniquely defined given f (t). We know that the curve traced by the agents of the first team x(t) is defined by their initial conditions and the function that they implement. Specifically, it is contained in the trajectory of team's A subsystem. So, as long as we can uniquely pinpoint a state x on subsystem's A trajectory Φ A (x 0 , ·), given x 0 and f (t), then this must correspond to team's A state in the complete system Φ((x 0 , y 0 ), ·). Moreover, in subsystem A, df dt > 0 unless we are at a fixed point. However, since x(t) is not time-invariant, x 0 is not a fixed point of subsystem A. Finally, by the uniqueness of the system solutions, we cannot reach a fixed point in finite time, and hence df dt > 0 for all times t ∈ R. So f as a function of time in subsystem A is always increasing, and it is smooth since f (Φ A (x 0 , ·)) is a composition of smooth functions. Thus, by the inverse function theorem (see Appendix C) f −1
x 0 exists 7 , is smooth, and is strictly increasing. Thus, it is bijective between its domain, lim t→−∞ f (Φ A (x 0 , t)), lim t→+∞ f (Φ A (x 0 , t)) = 8 (0, 1), and R and given an input v = f (Φ A (x 0 , t)) in its domain f x 0 returns t, the unique time instance at which the Lyapunov function in subsystem A attains value v given initial condition x 0 . Thus, f −1 x 0 is well defined given x 0 alone. We define as P roj i the projection function that given a vector returns its i-th element, i.e., P roj i (x) = x i . Putting everything together, X x 0
x 0 (·) indeeds recovers the accurate state of agent i in team A given the current value of f in system Φ, i.e., f Φ (x 0 , y 0 ), t , since it lies in lim t→−∞ f (Φ A (x 0 , t)), lim t→+∞ f (Φ A (x 0 , t)) = (0, 1).
Finally, we continuously extend X x 0 i to [0, 1]. 7 The inverse function of f is effectively parametrized by x0 and that's why we write f We return to the study of the two team system and argue about the periodicity of its orbits (f (t), g(t)). Due to the existence of functions X x 0 i , Y y 0 j , mapping (f (t), g(t)) to a unique (x(t), y(t)) the periodicity of (f (t), g(t)) extends to the system trajectories of Φ. To simplify notation will we write from now on X i , Y j instead of X x 0 i , Y y 0 j but the dependency on x 0 , y 0 should be kept in mind.
Definition 7.
(p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical system: We define the following class of planar dynamical systems on [0, 1] 2 parametrized by a point (p, q) ∈ (0, 1) 2 and two smooth functions r, w defined on [0, 1] with r(0) = r(1) = w(0) = w(1) = 0 that are strictly positive in (0, 1). Given such p, q, r, w we define a (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical system as follows:
The existence, uniqueness and smoothness of global solutions in the case of (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical systems follows from standard arguments, since the compact region [0, 1] 2 is invariant and the vector field is smooth. (see e.g., [2] )
Proof For our two team systems we have that
is a smooth function and is clearly nonnegative since X i f (t) ∈ [0, 1]. If f (t) = 0, i.e., E s∼x f (s) = 0, since x corresponds to a product distribution and f is a Boolean function we have that for each i either x i = 0 or x i = 1, or the value of f over all outcomes in the support of x are equal to 0.
A similar argument can be applied if f (t) = 1. Finally, we will argue that since x 0 is safe then r(f ) is strictly positive for f ∈ (0, 1). It suffices to show that for any f (t) ∈ (0, 1),
Since f (t) ∈ (0, 1) there must exist some randomizing agents in distribution x. Amongst these agents, there must exist an agent
, since otherwise the state where each agent i of team A plays X i (f (t)) would be a non-pure fixed point of subsystem A contradicting the assumption that the initial condition (x 0 , y 0 ) is safe. The argument for g, i.e., team B follows along the same lines as for team A.
Constants of Motion, Hamiltonian Systems, and Periodicity
Finally, we establish that the two dimensional system that couples f, g together is effectively a conservative system that preserves an energy-like function. It is easy to check that if in the definition of our (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical system we set the functions r, w being everywhere equal to 1 then after a change of variables f = ζ − q, g = ξ − p, the dynamical system has the form:
∂f , which is a prototypical Hamiltonian system with Hamiltonian function equal to H = f 2 +g 2 2 . All of its trajectories are cycles centered at 0. The conserved quantity, i.e., the "constant of the motion", in our case is described in the following lemma and leveraging it we will establish that the system trajectories are periodic.
Lemma 9. The quantity
is a constant of the motion (first integral) of the (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical system, i.e., it is time-invariant given any initial condition.
Proof By applying the chain rule on
we have:
Theorem 10. Every safe initial condition (x 0 , y 0 ) lies on a periodic orbit of Φ.
Proof From lemma 8 the system corresponds to a (p, q, r, w)-planar system. If (x 0 , y 0 ) is a Nash fixed point of Φ then it is trivially a periodic point. Suppose (x 0 , y 0 ) is not a Nash fixed point, then either f = p or g = q (or both). In all cases H f (x 0 ), g(y 0 ) > 0 and due to lemma 9 the trajectory of the planar system stays bounded away from its unique interior equilibrium (p, q), since H(p, q) = 0. Moreover, the gradient of H at (ξ, ζ) is equal to ( ξ−p r(ξ) , ζ−q w(ζ) ) and thus we can create a trapping/invariant region C = {(x, y) : 0 < α < H(x, y) < β} ⊂ (0, 1) 2 \ (p, q). By the Poincaré-Bendixson theorem and since the trapping (invariant) regions does not contain any fixed points the α, ω-limit set of the trajectory is a periodic orbit. Since the gradient of H is only equal to 0 at (p, q), H f (x 0 ), g(y 0 ) is a regular value of H. By the regular value theorem H −1 H f (x 0 ), g(y 0 ) is a manifold of dimension 1. The union of the trajectory starting at (x 0 , y 0 ), along with its α, ω−limit sets, is a closed, connected 1-manifold and thus it is isomorphic to S 1 (see Appendix C).
At this point, we are ready to piece together all our structural characterizations of the system trajectories to derive our first main theorem: Theorem 11. Given any two-team zero-sum game defined by two Boolean functions, so long as all equilibria/fixed points are isolated, then all but a zero measure set of initial conditions lie on periodic trajectories of the replicator dynamics Proof By theorem 4 since all the system equilibria are isolated, then all but a measure zero set of initial conditions are safe. By lemma 8 and 10, the projection of these trajectories on the space of outputs of each of the two teams, i.e. on the space (f, g) is periodic. Finally, by 6 given a safe initial condition z 0 = (x 0 , y 0 ), of system Φ as well that the values f (t), g(t), there exist smooth functions
)) for all t ∈ R and for each agent i of team A (resp. for each agent j of team B), thus the periodicity of f (t), g(t) translates to a periodic orbit on the space of system behaviors, i.e. on (x(t), y(t)) and the proof is complete.
Time Averages, Connections to Equilibria and Utility
Next, we will show that the time-average of the periodic trajectories of replicator dynamics satisfies some interesting game theoretic properties. In order to discuss these properties, it is useful to provide a reminder on some of the most basic solution concepts in game theory.
We give the definition of a correlated equilibrium, from [5] .
Definition 12.
A correlated equilibrium (CE) is a distribution π over the set of action profiles S = i S i such that for all player i and strategies s i , s i ∈ S i , s i = s i ,
We will also make use of the coarse correlated equilibrium ( [51] ), which is exactly the set of distribution that no-regret algorithms converge to. This convergence is only set-wise, i.e., distance of the time average behavior of no-regret dynamics and the set of CCE converges to zero, however, the time-average play may never converge to a specific CCE.
Definition 13. A coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) is a distribution π over the set of action profiles S = i S i such that for all player i and strategy
is the marginal distribution of π with respect to i.
First, we will show that the time-average distribution over the space of strategy outcomes over any periodic orbit is a coarse correlated equilibrium. Furthermore, the time-average of the output of each team f, g corresponds to the unique Nash equilibrium of the 2 × 2 zero-sum game. Finally, the expected utilities of all agents correspond to the value of each of their respective teams in their zero-sum game. In effect, the sexual replicator dynamics enable the agents of each team to collaborate with each other so as to optimally solve the zero-sum game against the opposing team. Figure 2 shows specific examples of periodic trajectories where time-averaging over them converges to the solution of a Matching Pennies game 9 between two teams. Theorem 14. Given any periodic orbit, the time average distribution of play over strategy outcomes converges point-wise to a specific correlated equilibrium.
Proof The time average of play is well defined and converges to a unique distribution over the space of strategy outcomes. Since the trajectory is periodic and the interior of the state space is invariant, the trajectory stays bounded away from the boundary of the state space. However, in this case the time average of the trajectory of the replicator converges to a coarse correlated equilibrium. More specifically, we will show that if any individual agent deviates to any fixed strategy then the time average of his expected utility does not decrease. 10 The replicator equatioṅ
, the expected utility of agent i when taking into account his randomized action as well.
Next, we will isolate the probability related terms x i on the LHS and all the utility related terms on the RHS and we will integrate over a time interval [0, T ] and divide by T . I.e.,
However, by a simple change of variables we have that
The LHS of equations 3, 4 converge to zero as T → ∞. Moreover, since the trajectories are periodic (e.g., with period T P ), all the following limits exist lim t→∞
. Thus, for any agent i:
and since no agent can improve their time average utility over a single period by deviating to any fixed strategy, then, by definition, the time average distribution of play over a single period is a coarse correlated equilibrium of the team zero-sum game.
Moreover, since in this game any agent has exactly two available strategies any coarse correlated equilibrium is also a correlated equilibrium. This is true, as the only extra allowable deviation that needs to be checked 11 is the one where he flips his strategy, i.e., whenever he played strategy 1 he now deviates to strategy 0, whereas whenever he played 0 he deviates to 1. However, we know that each of these deviations cannot improve the agent's expected utility (by the coarse correlated equilibrium property), so the combined deviation does not improve his expected utility either.
Theorem 15. Given any periodic orbit 12 the time average output T 0 f (t)dt, T 0 g(t)dt of each team converges to the unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium of the team game, i.e. p, q respectively. Moreover, the time average expected utility of each agent converges to the value of his team in the 2 × 2 zero-sum game U .
Proof By lemma 8, we have that the outputs f, g satisfy a (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical system:
Since f, g are strictly positive along the periodic orbit, 13 we can isolate f, g on different parts of the equation, and then we integrate over a time interval [0, T ] and divide by T .
11 Checked in terms of whether it can improve the agent's expected utility. 12 We implicitly assume that this corresponds to a generic, safe initial condition. 13 Since it lies in the interior of [0, 1] 2 and by the definition of our (p, q, r, w)-planar dynamical systems.
Next, we will proceed with the argument about the time average of the agents' utility. Let
then the expected utility all agents in team A is equal to f T U g.
mixed Nash equilibrium strategies of the 2 × 2 zero-sum game. So, we have that:
Therefore in order to argue that
, that the time average of agents' utility is equal to the value of their respective team in the 2 × 2 zero-sum game U , it suffices to show that lim T →∞
The payoff matrix U is as follows:
. Therefore it suffices to show that 
However,
, and the proof is complete.
Discussion
We have identified a novel class of conservative dynamical systems that arise from the simutaneous application of learning dynamics by many (independently acting) agents, provided those agents partition into two teams, with aligned interests within each team and opposed interests across the teams. These learning dynamics are precisely those widely studied recently in learning theory; they are also those studied in the evolutionary theory of sexually reproducing species ("species"="team of genes"). Beyond having a conserved quantity, these high-dimensional dynamical systems have several properties, each of which was surprising: (a) The dynamics are periodic for almost all initial conditions. (b) The dynamics of the agents not only minimize regret (converge to coarse correlated equilibria) but furthermore the time average of any trajectory converges point-wise to a correlated equilibrium that is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. (c) The time average play of these trajectories are shown to implement the minmax strategies of each species in its struggle for survival against the opposing species. (d) The time average utility of each agent, under these dynamics, is actually the same as if each team was cooperating to play its best strategy at every moment in time-despite the fact that the agents are not cooperating (the distribution of play by a team is always a product distribution across agents), and that their play is not constant in time nor converging to a constant in time.
Each of these properties is, to our knowledge, without precedent in high dimensional dynamics of learning / sexual evolution. Cyclic trajectories are known to exist in low dimensional game theoretic systems, systems of species competition or even hypercycle equations, but no such result is known for larger systems [20] . Conversely, there exist many simple low dimensional examples where replicator dynamics can have complex trajectories [38] .
The results of this paper are obtained entirely in an infinite-population, continuous-time limit. Finite-population, discrete-time models have a number of defects, not least of which are that they have too many adjustable parameters, and that rounding and drift terms turn conserved quantities into "almost conserved" quantities. Having said this, the issue cannot be ignored, as there are known situations in which finite-population models have qualitatively different behavior than their corresponding infinite-population model [4] . In our situation, the periodicity theorem actually guarantees that the dynamics of the system keep every allele frequency bounded away from 0 and 1; in the short run this precludes irreversible rounding errors that occur when such a frequency is rounded to 0 or 1. Of course, roundings by 1/population must occur, so in the long run, such rounding may accumulate until the dynamics are very far from the infinite-limit cycle, and then, eventually, roundings to 0 or 1 can occur. For moderate time scales we do not expect this to affect the predictions of the paper. (For long time scales one must keep in mind that our theorems depend also on other idealizations of the model, notably the weak selection hypothesis and the absence of other effects such as mutations or selective mating patterns.)
B Proof of Theorem 4
The high level idea is that by definition, if x 0 and y 0 are safe for subsystems Φ A and Φ B respectively then (x 0 , y 0 ) is safe for system Φ as well. However, subsystems Φ A , Φ B correspond to replicator dynamics being applied to a potential game. By applying a game theoretic characterization of stable equilibria in potential games for replicator dynamics developed in [22] we can show that replicator dynamics does not converge to such randomized states for all but a zero measure of initial conditions in each subsystem. Thus, all but a measure 0 set of initial conditions are safe in Φ as well. We will start the formal proof by providing the relevant definitions and theorems from [22] .
Definition 16 ([22]).
A Nash equilibrium is called weakly stable if each agent i remains indifferent between the strategies in the support of his (mixed) strategy x i whenever any other single player j modifies his mixed strategy to any pure strategy in the support of his (mixed) strategy x j . Theorem 17 ([22] ). For all initial conditions replicator dynamics converges to equilibria in potential games. If a fixed point that is not a Nash equilibrium, the set of initial conditions converging to is of zero measure. If a fixed point is not a weakly stable Nash equilibrium, the set of initial conditions converging to is of zero measure.
Lemma 18. If x is an isolated, not pure, fixed point of subsystem A, i.e., with at least one randomizing agent i such that f i0 = f i1 = f , then it cannot be a weakly stable Nash equilibrium in the partnership/potential game where all agents receive in each outcome utility equal to the output of their Boolean function f (x). A symmetric statement holds for y, isolated, not pure, fixed point of subsystem B.
Proof We will prove the contrapositive. If an equilibrium is weakly stable that means by definition 16 that given any single deviation of a randomizing agent i to a pure strategy no other randomizing agent can deviate and improve his/her payoff. However, this means that in both outcomes (0,x −i ), (1,x −i ) (for which f i0 = f i1 = f by the fixed point property) no randomizing agent can deviate and increase his/her payoff. This implies that f i0i 0 = f i0i 1 = f i0 = f for any randomizing agent i in x (of team A). Similarly, that f i1i 0 = f i1i 1 = f i1 = f for any randomizing agent i in team A. Hence the outcomes (0,x −i ), (1,x −i ) are fixed points of subsystem A. Moreover, as long as exactly two (randomizing) agents, fix their behavior then the expected output of the Boolean function does not change. We will show that any product distribution (δ,x −i ) where 0 < δ < 1 is also a fixed point. It suffices to check all the (randomizing) agents other than i. If this set is empty we are done. Otherwise, let i be such an agent. Any such agent when deviating to a pure strategy receives utility equal to the expected output of team's A Boolean function. For example if he deviates to his first strategy then he receives f iδi 0 = δf i0i 0 + (1 − δ)f i1i 0 = f . Hence, (δ,x −i ) is a fixed point as well for any δ ∈ [0, 1] and the initial fixed point x is not isolated.
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof By definition, if x 0 and y 0 are safe for subsystems Φ A and Φ B respectively then (x 0 , y 0 ) is safe for system Φ as well. However, subsystems Φ A , Φ B correspond to replicator dynamics being applied to a potential game. By lemma 18 we have that an isolated, not pure, fixed point of subsystem A or B, cannot be a weakly stable Nash equilibrium in the partnership/potential game where all agents receive in each outcome utility equal to the output of their Boolean function f (x). By applying Theorem 17 the set of initial conditions that converge to any such equilibrium as t → ∞ is a measure zero set. By applying Theorem 17 on the cost minimization potential game 14 where at any outcome x agents have to pay cost equal to the output of their Boolean function f (x), we derive that the set of initial conditions that converge in subsystem A to any such equilibrium as t → −∞ is still a measure zero set. Finally, by assumption all system equilibria are isolated and thus there can only be finitely many of them. 15 So, by taking union bound over all not pure, isolated fixed points we have that the set of all initial conditions converging to them as t → ±∞ in each subsystem is a zero measure set. Since the state space Φ is the product of the state spaces of Φ A , Φ B , the set of all such conditions (x 0 , y 0 ) such that either x 0 or y 0 are not safe is a measure zero set of the state space of Φ.
C Background on Topology, Manifolds, and Dynamics A 1-manifold (or manifold of dimension 1) is a topological space which is second countable (i.e., its topological structure has a countable base), satisfies the Hausdorff axiom (i.e., any two different points have disjoint neighborhoods) and each point of which has a neighborhood homeomorphic either to the real line R or to the half-line R + = {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0}.
Theorem 21 ([18]
). Any connected closed 1-manifold is homeomorphic to S 1 = {(x, y) ∈ R 2 : x 2 + y 2 = 1}. Definition 22. Let U, V be manifolds. A map f : U → V is called a diffeomorphism if f carries U onto V and also both f and f −1 are smooth.
Definition 23. Let f : U → V be a smooth map between same dimensional manifolds. We denote that x ∈ U is a regular point if the derivative is nonsingular. y ∈ V is called a regular value if f −1 (y) contains only regular points. If the derivative is singular, then x is called a critical point. We also say y ∈ V is a critical value if y is not a regular value.
For a smooth function on R n to R, a point p is critical if all of the partial derivatives of the function are zero at p, or, equivalently, if its gradient is zero. Given a differentiable map f from R m into R n , the critical points of f are the points of R m , where the rank of the Jacobian matrix of f is not maximal.
14 A fully mixed fixed point (or more generally a fixed point where for each agent i his expected utility remains constant when unilaterally deviating to any other strategy) is a Nash equilibrium in both the payoff maximization and the cost minimization game, i.e., it does not matter if you receive or pay f (x) and in both games for the same reasons it is not a weakly mixed Nash. On the other hand, if there exists an agent i such that when unilaterally deviating to another strategy his payoff decreases then in the cost game this fixed point is no longer a Nash equilibrium and Theorem 17 still implies a zero measure of initial conditions converging to it. 15 Otherwise, given any countable set of equilibria by compactness of the state space there will be a concentration point in this sequence, which leads to a contradiction since every fixed point is isolated.
Theorem 24 (Sard's Theorem). Let f : X → Y be a smooth map of manifolds, and let C be the set of critical points of f in X. Then f (C) has measure zero in Y .
Theorem 25 (Regular Value Theorem).
If y ∈ Y is a regular value of f : X → Y then f −1 (y) is a manifold of dimension n − m, since dim(X) = n and dim(Y ) = m.
Theorem 26 (Inverse Function Theorem). Let U, V be open sets of R n . If f : U → V is a smooth map and at a point p the jacobian matrix df p is invertible, then there is a neighborhood U of p on which f : U → f (U ) is a diffeomorphism.
For functions of a single variable, the theorem states that if f is a smooth function with nonzero derivative at the point p, then f is invertible in a neighborhood of p, the inverse is smooth, and f −1 (f (p)) = 1 f (p) , where the left side notation refers to the derivative of the inverse function evaluated at f (p).
Poincaré-Bendixson Theorem
The Poincaré-Bendixson theorem is a powerful theorem that implies that two-dimensional systems cannot exhibit chaos. Effectively, the limit behavior is either going to be an equilibrium, a periodic orbit, or a closed loop, punctuated by one (or more) fixed points. Formally, we have:
Theorem 27 ( [7, 43] ). Given a differentiable real dynamical system defined on an open subset of the plane, then every non-empty compact ω-limit set of an orbit, which contains only finitely many fixed points, is either a fixed point, a periodic orbit, or a connected set composed of a finite number of fixed points together with homoclinic and heteroclinic orbits connecting these.
